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PROSECUTORIAL MISUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSPIRACY STATUTE IN ELECTION LAW
CASES
By Lance Colet and Ross Nabatofft
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal prosecutors do not like to bring misdemeanor cases in white collar
criminal investigations. Experienced white collar defense lawyers will tell you
this, and candid federal prosecutors will admit it. Misdemeanor charges are
seen as "small potatoes" that do not impose sufficiently onerous penalties on
offenders and do not justify the employment of limited prosecutorial resources.
Perhaps more importantly from a prosecutor's perspective, a misdemeanor
charge may be insufficient to force a low-level offender to cooperate with
prosecutors and "deliver the goods" on higher-ups against whom the govern-
ment may not be able to make a case without such cooperation.' Although
prosecutors tend to shun and ignore misdemeanor offenses, Congress has
sprinkled them liberally through the United States Code (U.S.C.). 2 In fact, it
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I. See generally CRAIG C. DONSANTO & NANCY S. STEWART, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MANUAL ON FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 108-109 (Laura A. Ingersoll ed., 6th ed.
1995) (encouraging federal prosecutors to charge aggravated campaign financing violations as felonies
because doing so offers strategic advantages for the prosecution) (hereinafter "DOJ MANUAL"). The
long-standing practice of federal prosecutors offering plea bargains and favorable treatment at sentenc-
ing in exchange for cooperation with the government's investigation was called into question by a deci-
sion of a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See United States v. Single-
ton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that prosecutors' promises of leniency in sentencing in
exchange for testimony violate the federal bribery statute). That decision, however, was subsequently
reversed by the Tenth Circuit sitting en banc. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.
1999).
2. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 167(g) (1994) (violation of Library of Congress laws); 4 U.S.C. § 3 (1994)
(use of the American flag within the District of Columbia for advertising purposes); 7 U.S.C. § 620
(1994) (falsely ascribing deductions or charges on tax return); 15 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994) (advertising
cigarettes through a medium of electronic communication); 16 U.S.C. § 256(b) (1994) (hunting, trap-
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has classified entire areas of proscribed conduct as misdemeanors. One such
area is election law offenses.3 Congress has defined as misdemeanors an entire
array of "garden-variety" campaign finance violations4 such as contributions
exceeding legal limits, 5 contributions using corporate or labor union funds, 6
contributions by foreign nationals, 7 and straw contributions in the name of an-
other.8
The Congressional definition of criminal election law offenses as misde-
meanors challenges federal prosecutors to find a way to punish offenders with
something more than "wrist slap" penalties. In the politically-charged envi-
ronment of the campaign fundraising scandal that arose out of the 1996 presi-
dential election, this problem assumed even greater significance. In the face of
repeated calls for appointment of an Independent Counsel, 9 Attorney General
Janet Reno and the Department of Justice created a special "Campaign Fi-
nancing Task Force" to investigate political fundraising for the 1996 presiden-
tial election. 1 Since its inception, the press and the public have scrutinized the
work of the Task Force closely," with pressure for "results" present through-
ping, fishing, or injuring wildlife in national parks); 18 U.S.C. § 228(b)(1) (1994) (failure to pay child
support obligations); 18 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (deprivation of employment for making political contribu-
tions); 21 U.S.C. § 117 (1994) (introduction into the United States of falsely labeled or branded food or
dairy products); 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1994) (willful failure to file tax return, supply information or pay
tax); 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1994) (willful violations of OSHA regulations that result in the death of an
employee); 33 U.S.C. § 1481 (1994) (willful violations of or refusal to comply with regulations con-
cerning pollution on the high seas).
3. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994).
4. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) (1994) (penalties for violating Federal Election Campaign Act). It is im-
portant to note at the outset of any discussion of election law offenses that not all violations of the fed-
eral election laws are misdemeanors subject to criminal prosecution. To the contrary, Congress has
specified that only "knowing and willful" violations warrant criminal prosecution, and most violations
are to be addressed by the Federal Election Commission in civil administrative proceedings, and not by
the Department of Justice in criminal prosecutions. See infra Section III.B.
5. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994) (limitations on contributions and expenditures).
6. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (contributions or expenditures by national banks, corporations, or labor or-
ganizations).
7. See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (contributions by foreign nationals).
8. See 2 U.S.C. § 44If(contributions in the name of another prohibited).
9. See Edwin Chen & David G. Savage, Counsel Law Is Tied up in Congressional Tug of War
Politics: GOP, Democrats Bicker over Need for Outside Prosecutor in Fund-Raising Probe. Reno Is
Caught in the Middle, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at AI5; Helen Dewar, Reno Gets GOP Request Under
Counsel Statute, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1997, at A22; Helen Dewar, Senate Seeks Special Counsel on
Presidential Election Funds, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1997, at A8; Neil A. Lewis, Senate Panel Focuses
on Reno-Freeh Dispute over Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1998, at Al; Lynn Sweet, Newt Puts
Heat on Reno; Congress May Question Her Handling of Fund-Raising Probe, CHi. SUN TIMES, Apr. 14,
1997, at 1.
10. See Robert L. Jackson & Alan C. Miller, Reno Rejects Call for Outside Probe of Fund-Raising,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at Al; Reno Rejects a Request for Independent Counsel, WALL ST. J., Nov.
11, 1996, at A11; Pierre Thomas, Justice Dept. Rejects One Request for Party Finance Probe, WASH.
POST, Nov. 9, 1996, at A17.
11. See, e.g., Robert L. Jackson & Marc Lacey, Reno Adds Staff to Donor Probe; Hearing Delayed
Fund-raising; Justice Dept. Task Force Gets New Leadership, More Attorneys to Speed up Probe.
House Panel Cancels its First Day of Testimony, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at A 14; Robert Suro, 'Cri-
sis in Confidence' Prompted Reno's Decision; Shake-up of Campaign Finance Task Force Intended to
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out the investigation. 2
The "results" that the Task Force has been under pressure to deliver are not
misdemeanor charges. 3 Prosecutors need felony cases to justify the enormous
effort and resources that they have devoted to the campaign fundraising inves-
tigation.' 4 It comes as no surprise, then, that prosecutors have spumed the mis-
demeanor penalties that Congress intended to apply to campaign fundraising
violations.15 Treating the election law provisions as unwanted stepchildren,
prosecutors instead have turned to their favorite child, what Judge Learned
Hand aptly called "the darling of the modem prosecutor's nursery,"'16 the fed-
eral conspiracy statute.'
7
The federal conspiracy statute is an unusually accommodating 18 and elastic
criminal law 19 that can be stretched to cover a wide variety of misconduct, in-
cluding election law violations. 20 Most important, if applied in a creative fash-
Inject Aggressiveness into Probe, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1997, at A10; Bob Woodward, FBI Had
Overlooked Key Files in Probe of Chinese Influence, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1997, at Al.
12. See David Jackson, Fund-Raising Indictments May Be Near. Probe into Clinton, Gore Phone
Calls Also Finishing, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 24, 1997, at Al ("Rejection of an independent
counsel would put more political pressure on a task force that has been criticized for slowness by con-
gressional Republicans and other critics of Mr. Clinton's campaign fund raising."); Robert Suro & Bob
Woodward, Justice Dept. Campaign Task Force Pressing for Cooperative Testimony, WASH. POST, Oct.
31, 1997, at A9 ("The threatened indictments follow a management shake-up in the year-old Justice task
force on campaign finance that has been harshly criticized by congressional Republicans for foot-
dragging and ineptitude.").
13. See generally Robert L. Jackson & Ronald J. Ostrow, Primary Target Charged in Probe of
Clinton Donors, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at Al (quoting an attorney defending an individual charged
with conspiracy to defraud the United States by funneling illegal foreign money into a reelection cam-
paign, as saying that his client's indictment "continues a pattern of the government inflating alleged
[Federal Election Commission] violations into massive felony charges").
14. See Don Van Natta, Jr. & David Johnston, Inquiry on Campaign Finance is Running Dry, Offi-
cials Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at Al (quoting a Department of Justice spokesperson stating that
"[tihis continues to be the department's largest criminal investigation, with more than 120 task-force
members, offices on two coasts and resources drawn from around the country").
15. See infra Part III.
16. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) ("It appears to us that the maximum
sentence prescribed by Congress is intended to cover the whole substantive offense in its extremest de-
gree, no matter in how many different ways a draughtsman may plead it, and even though he may add a
count for conspiracy, that darling of the modem prosecutor's nursery."); see also Abraham S. Goldstein,
Conspiracy To Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 409 (1959) ("'Conspiracy' has been a fa-
vorite of prosecutors for centuries. The reasons for its popularity lie partly in history, partly in the in-
creased punishment potential afforded by its status as a separate crime. Most potent of all, however, has
been the tactical advantage it brings to the prosecutor. By charging 'conspiracy,' he can reach persons
who might escape conviction if they were proceeded against separately or if they were charged with
accomplished harm to the community.").
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
18. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957) ("[We will view with disfavor at-
tempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions.");
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The modem crime of
conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition.").
19. See Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 445 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[The crime of conspiracy is an]
elastic, sprawling, and pervasive offense."); see also Goldstein, supra note 16, at 428 (referring to the
defraud clause and stating that "the resourceful prosecutor could turn to this crime of many meanings
and seemingly infinite elasticity").
20. See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994) (charging the defendant with conspir-
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ion, it can be used to charge garden-variety misdemeanor campaign finance
violations21 as felonies punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to five
years and a fine of up to $250,00022 for each count. Like a legal alchemist, an
aggressive federal prosecutor can take the base metal of a mundane case of
misdemeanor election law violations and turn it into the gleaming gold of a
multi-count federal felony indictment-precisely the kind of white collar
criminal case federal prosecutors like to bring.
This practice of "turning misdemeanors into felonies" merits skepticism
and close scrutiny. How federal prosecutors employ this tactic and whether the
federal judiciary should permit them to do it are important issues.23 As this Ar-
ticle will show, the language and legislative history of two federal statutes
demonstrate conclusively that Congress did not intend for campaign finance
violations to be prosecuted as felonies. Despite this clear evidence of legisla-
tive intent, the Department of Justice has developed "felony theories for FECA
prosecutions."
24
This "overcharging" of campaign financing violations is seldom chal-
lenged, however. In the current political environment, a member of Congress is
unlikely to object to overly aggressive prosecution of campaign finance viola-
tions. Any member of Congress who does so would be vulnerable to political
attack for being "soft" on enforcement of election laws. In addition, most fed-
eral judges do not carefully scrutinize the Department of Justice's felony con-
spiracy theories, in part because a large body of precedent superficially appears
25to support expansive application of the federal conspiracy statute. These
practical realities should not embolden the Department of Justice to ignore the
law and to seek far harsher punishment than Congress intended. This Article
explains why the Department of Justice's policy is wrong and why the federal
courts should scrutinize these felony theories for election law prosecutions
acy to impede the lawful functions of the Federal Election Commission by causing campaign treasurers
to submit false reports to the Commission); United States v. Goland, 959 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1992)
(charging the defendant with a conspiracy to cause the treasurers of two campaign committees to file
false reports with the Federal Election Commission concerning the sources of campaign financing sup-
plied to them by the defendant); United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1990) (charging the
defendants with a conspiracy to disguise corporate political contributions as individual contributions and
to interfere with the proper reporting of campaign contributions to the Federal Election Commission, as
well as charging them with various banking offenses).
21. Federal law defines felonies as offenses for which the authorized term of imprisonment is more
than one year and misdemeanors as offenses for which the authorized term of imprisonment is not more
than one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 3581 (1994) (defining five classes of felonies and four classes of misde-
meanors based on the length of the authorized term of imprisonment). For a defendant in an election law
case, this distinction between a misdemeanor and a felony is enormously important. A misdemeanor
offense under the election laws is subject to a term of imprisonment of "not more than one year." 2
U.S.C. § 437g(d) (1994). A felony conspiracy offense is subject to a fine and a term of imprisonment of
up to five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3)(1994).
23. See infra Part Il.
24. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 108.
25. See infra Part II.
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more carefully on motions to dismiss.
Part II of this Article examines the historical development of the federal
conspiracy statute. In Section A, we outline the broadening of the statute from
its origin as a measure to curtail tax fraud to a general anti-crime measure.
Section B examines federal prosecutors' use of the statute during the Prohibi-
tion era to bring felony conspiracy charges for misdemeanor violations of the
National Prohibition Act. In Section C we detail the cautionary skepticism that
federal courts expressed in response to this Prohibition-era tactic. Finally, Sec-
tion D analyzes the 1948 amendments to the conspiracy statute and shows that
Congress amended the statute to stop prosecutors from using it to bring felony
conspiracy charges for conduct that Congress had classified as misdemeanor
offenses.
Part III critiques the current use of the federal conspiracy statute, often in
conjunction with the federal false statements statute,26 to bring felony charges
in election law cases. In Section A we outline the history of campaign finance
laws and the misdemeanor penalties that currently apply to violations. Section
B details criteria that distinguish civil from criminal election law violations and
explains felony charging theories that prosecutors have developed. Finally,
Section C analyzes recent court decisions in campaign finance cases where fel-
ony conspiracy charges were brought.
In Part IV we conclude that despite ad hoc checks on prosecutorial abuse
reflected in recent case law, both courts and prosecutors should be more mind-
ful of congressional intent and stop the practice of straining to bring felony
charges when Congress clearly intended for misdemeanor penalties to apply.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Origins and Expansion of the Federal Conspiracy Statute
Congress enacted the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 371, the modem conspir-
acy statute, 27 in 1867 as one part of a thirty-four-section statute aimed at
"plugging loop-holes in the tax laws." 28 Congress intended the conspiracy pro-
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
27. See Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484. Section 30 provided in part that "if two
or more persons conspire either to commit any offence against the laws of the United States, or to de-
fraud the United States in any manner whatever, and one or more of said parties to said conspiracy shall
do any act to effect the object thereof, the parties to said conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and on conviction thereof shall be liable to a penalty of not less than one thousand dollars and
not more than ten thousand dollars, and to impriso[n]ment not exceeding two years." See id.; see also
Goldstein, supra note 16, at 417-418 (outlining the history of and motivations behind the statute). In the
1875 codification the statute was altered to read "to defraud the United States in any manner or for any
purpose." Id. at 418, n. 36. By 1918 the penalty provisions of the statute had been increased so that of-
fenders could be "fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than two years or
both." United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 223 (1918) (quoting statute).
28. Goldstein, supra note 16, at 418.
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visions to provide a federal remedy for efforts to defraud the United States out
of tax revenue, conduct not covered elsewhere in the federal criminal code.29
In 1879, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Hirsch,30 the first case
to expand the scope of the conspiracy statute beyond tax fraud. This holding
ultimately led to the statute's current status as a mainstay of federal law en-
forcement.3 1 The Court concluded that the reach of the conspiracy statute
32
extended beyond frauds to cheat the United States out of revenue and could be
applied to "any fraud" against the government. 33 The Court based its decision
on the lack of reference to internal revenue in the language of the statute and
the fact that the 1867 law was entitled, "An Act to amend existing laws relating
to internal revenue, and for other purposes. '34 The Court found this language a
sufficient indication of Congressional intent to enact a "general penal provi-
sion" against conspiracies that was not limited to internal revenue offenses.
35
The 1910 decision in Haas v. Henke 3 6 further expanded the reach of the
conspiracy statute. In Haas, the defendants had bribed a Department of Agri-
culture official to provide them with advance notice of information in cotton
crop reports.37 Even though the charges did not allege any direct pecuniary loss
to the government, the Court allowed the conspiracy count to stand: "[I]t is not
essential that such a conspiracy shall contemplate a financial loss or that one
shall result. The statute is broad enough in its terms to include any conspiracy
for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of
any department of Government. 38 Hirsch had already freed the conspiracy
statute from its original mooring to the government's revenue-raising function;
Haas freed it altogether from a limitation to financial crimes.39 After Haas, the
29. See United States v. Minarik, 875 F.2d 1186, 1194 (6th Cir. 1989) (discussing targeted con-
duct); see also Goldstein, supra note 16, at 417-418.
30. 100 U.S. 33 (1879).
31. See generally Goldstein, supra note 16, at 417-36 (describing in detail the history of the con-
spiracy statute).
32. See Hirsch, 100 U.S. at 35 (quoting the statute as modified in the 1875 codification: "If two or
more persons conspire, either to commit any offence against the United States or to defraud the United
States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more such parties do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, all the parties shall be liable").
33. Id.
34. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
35. Id.; see also Goldstein, supra note 16 at 419-20. As Goldstein, the leading commentator on the
federal conspiracy statute, has observed, while this decision deprived the prosecution of the longer
limitations period then in effect for revenue offenses, it "gave to the Government far more than it took
away" because thereafter "prosecutors, unconfined by legislative history, would be able to press for new
applications of the statute." Id. This observation has proved prescient in light of federal prosecutors'
recent use of the conspiracy statute in election law cases. See infra Part III.
36. 216 U.S. 462 (1910).
37. See id. at 472.
38. Id. at 479.
39. Cf McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (explaining that the words "to defraud"
commonly refer to "wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes," and "usually
signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching") (citation omit-
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only limits on the application of the conspiracy statute were federal court inter-
pretations of what constituted interference with lawful government functions.
The Supreme Court did recognize some limits on this concept of "interfer-
ence with government functions." In United States v. Gradwell,40 the Court de-
clined to extend the reach of the conspiracy statute to cover voter fraud during
federal elections in Rhode Island and West Virginia. The Court concluded that
the conspiracy statute should not apply because the policy of Congress at that
time was to leave regulation of elections to the states, while the conspiracy
statute applied to offenses against the operation of the federal government and
not the states.4 1 In Hammerschmidt v. United States,42 the Court refused to ex-
tend the conspiracy statute to cover efforts to prevent young men from regis-
tering for the draft.43 The Hammerschmidt Court agreed with the conclusion in
Haas that pecuniary loss is not required, and that to defraud the United States
"also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful governmental func-
tions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest. '"
However, this broad language, which has often been quoted in later conspiracy
law decisions,45 was deemed insufficiently expansive to encompass the actions
of the defendants in Hammerschmidt, which the Court characterized as "a mere
open defiance of the governmental purpose to enforce a law by urging persons
subject to it to disobey it." 46
B. Prosecutorial Misuse of the Conspiracy Statute During Prohibition
Prosecutors stretched the conspiracy statute beyond recognition during the
Prohibition era, unchecked by the courts. From 1920 through 1933, 47 federal
ted). In McNally the Court explained that the mail fraud statute requires some sort of property depriva-
tion even though the conspiracy statute has no such requirement. The Court distinguished the conspiracy
statute, asserting that its original aim was "protecting the federal government alone" while the mail
fraud statute "had its origin in the desire to protect individual property rights, and [therefore] any benefit
which the Government derives from the statute must be limited to the Government's interests as prop-
erty holder." Id. at 358, n.8. Congress subsequently amended the federal mail fraud statute to in effect
overrule McNally's requirement of a property deprivation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994) ("For the pur-
poses of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services.").
40. 243 U.S. 476 (1917).
41. See id. at 485. The subsequent enactment by Congress of a comprehensive set of federal elec-
tion laws, discussed infra Part III, obviously has limited the reach of the Gradwell holding.
42. 265 U.S. 182 (1924).
43. See id. at 189.
44. Id. at 188; cf McNally, 483 U.S. at 358 n.8 (quoting Hammerschmidt).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Haga, 821 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hammer-
schmidt).
46. Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 189; see also United States v. Caldwell, 989 F.2d 1056, 1059 n.3
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that, under Hammerschmidt, conspiring to obstruct a function of the govern-
ment is not sufficient to support a section 371 conspiracy charge if the government fails to show that
"deceitful or dishonest means" were used to effectuate the scheme).
47. See generally Kenneth J. Murchison, Prohibition and the Fourth Amendment: A New Look at
Some Old Cases, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 474 (1982) (summarizing legislative develop-
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prosecutors often used the conspiracy statute to bring felony charges against
persons who had committed misdemeanor violations48 of the National Prohibi-
tion Act (NPA).49 Defense counsel in the Prohibition cases argued that it was
unjust to impose on a defendant a greater punishment for a conspiracy to com-
mit an offense than the punishment prescribed for the offense itself,50 and that
the offense of conspiracy should merge into the lesser misdemeanor offenses
prescribed under the NPA. The courts, however, rejected these contentions. 51
Defense counsel in these cases reasoned that if Congress had intended to
impose a harsher conspiracy punishment than that of the underlying offense, it
would have done so.52 In Murry v. United States53 the Eighth Circuit rejected
this argument.54 Subsequent courts inferred that Congress's silence concerning
the punishment for a conspiracy conviction meant that a conspiracy to commit
any offense against the United States, whether misdemeanor or felony, could
be punished as a felony. For example, in Welter v. United States,55 the defen-
dant was convicted of conspiracy to violate provisions of the NPA that made it
56a misdemeanor offense to possess and transport intoxicating liquors. He was
sentenced to confinement in a penitentiary for one year and one day and re-
quired to pay a $2000 fine. 57 On appeal he argued that the indictment was de-
fective because under the NPA possessing and transporting intoxicating liquors
was only a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine only, while violation of the con-
spiracy statute subjected him to imprisonment, and therefore was a felony. The
Welter court, relying on Murry, upheld the indictment and felony conviction
for conspiracy.
58
C. Judicial Discomfort with Proliferating Conspiracy Prosecutions
Welter was decided on January 28, 1925. In June of that year, the Confer-
ence of Senior Circuit Judges recommended that Congress consider whether
changes in the law were needed to address "the prevalent use of conspiracy in-
ments relating to Prohibition); Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-First Amendment and State
Control over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REv. 161, 174-80
(1991) (summarizing the history of Prohibition in the United States).
48. See Welter v. United States, 4 F.2d 342, 343 (8th Cir. 1925) (holding that the conspiracy in-
dictments are valid).
49. National Prohibition Act of 1919, ch. 85, § 1, 41 Stat. 305 (codified at 27 U.S.C. § I and re-
pealed in 1935); see also Murry v. United States, 282 F. 617, 618 (8th Cir. 1922) (holding that the fel-
ony conspiracy charge does not merge into the lesser charges).
50. See Murry, 282 F. at 618.
51. See Welter, 4 F.2d at 343 (citing Murry).
52. See Murry, 282 F. at 618.
53. 282 F. 617 (8th Cir. 1922).
54. See id.
55. 4 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1925).
56. See id. at 343.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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dictments for converting a joint misdemeanor into a felony."5 9 The judges
added that "we express our conviction that both for this purpose and for the
purpose--or at least with the effect--of bringing in much improper evidence,
the conspiracy statute is being much abused., 60 The judges strongly con-
demned the practice of using the conspiracy statute in cases where the "sub-
stantial base" of "a serious and substantially continued group scheme for coop-
erative law breaking" was not present.
61
The 1925 Report of the Senior Circuit Judges identified two serious poten-
tial problems with overly aggressive use of the conspiracy statute: (1) charging
as a felony conduct that should be punished as a misdemeanor, and (2) practi-
cal difficulties faced by innocent defendants attempting to defend against a
conspiracy charge.62 The former concern has received less attention and is the
focus of this Article. The latter concern pertains to the tactical difficulties63 of
defending against a conspiracy charge. 64 These practical difficulties, which
have been described elsewhere, 65 include the broadening of venue to any-
where any action connected to the conspiracy occurred,66 the admission of
59. 1925 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 5.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 6.
62. See id. at 5-6.
63. See Goldstein, supra note 16, at 440-441:
But where [the conspiracy statute's] primary function once was to reach conduct not covered
elsewhere in the criminal code, it now serves its original purpose in very limited fashion. Its
main significance today is in the field of tactics. Given the choice, a prosecutor will invariably
choose to proceed under the statute which affords him the maximum flexibility in framing his
charge and presenting his proof. The addition of the conspiracy count (already described as
the "prosecutor's darling") to the loosely-defmed concept of fraud makes conspiracy "'to de-
fraud the United States"' peculiarly attractive to the prosecutor and particularly subversive of
principles deeply rooted in our criminal law. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
64. See Todd R. Russell & 0. Carter Snead, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
739, 740 (1998) ("It is clear that a conspiracy charge gives the prosecution certain unique advantages
and that one who must defend against such a charge bears a particularly heavy burden.") (quoting
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. ScoTr JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4 (b), at 526 (2d ed. 1986)).
65. See generally Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back From an Ever Ex-
panding, Ever More Troubling Area, I WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1, 25 (1992) (arguing that there are
many important advantages for the government when it seeks a conspiracy charge); see also United
States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 41 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977):
The potential for abuse in allowing the government to manipulate a prosecution by easy access
to the conspiracy-to-defraud clause is clear. The crime of conspiracy to defraud is broader and
less precise than that of conspiracy to commit a particular offense. By invoking the former, the
scope of the conspiracy appears to increase - thereby increasing the defendant's apparent li-
ability for substantive crimes committed by co-conspirators and the apparent admissibility of
declarations made by co-conspirators . . . the period of the statute of limitations seems to
lengthen ... and an argument might be made that the number of districts in which venue can
be laid had been increased.
66. See Marcus, supra note 65, at 25 (discussing venue as being one of the evidentiary advantages
of bringing a conspiracy charge, "[v]enue is proper in any jurisdiction in which an overt act, any overt
act, took place"); see also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AusTIN W. ScoTr JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 64-65 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that the prosecution
may elect to have the trial in any locale where any overt act by any of the conspirators took place);
Goldstein, supra note 16, at 409-10 n. II ("Venue attaches at the place either of the agreement or of any
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statements of co-conspirators that otherwise would be excluded by the hearsay
rule,67 and the extension of statutes of limitations far beyond the time they
would expire if conspiracy was not charged.68
The 1925 Report explicitly suggested that it is unfair to use the conspiracy
statute to charge as a felony conduct that Congress has specifically defined as a
misdemeanor:
We note the prevalent use of the conspiracy indictments for converting a joint mis-
demeanor into a felony, and we express our conviction that.., the conspiracy stat-
ute is being much abused .... We think it proper for us to bring this matter to the
attention of the District Judges, with the request that they present it to the district
attorneys, and for us to bring it also to the attention of the Attorney General, with
the suggestion that he call it to the attention of the district attorneys, as in his judg-
ment may be proper, and all to the end that this form of indictment be hereafter not
adopted hastily but only after a careful conclusion that the public interest so re-
quires, and to the end that transformations of a misdemeanor into a felony should
not be thus accomplished, unless the propriety thereof clearly appears. We also
think proper to bring the subject matter to the attention of Congress, that it may
consider whether any change of the law in this respect is advisable.
69
After the Report, federal courts began to criticize the misuse of the conspir-
acy statute in published opinions. In 1928, for example, the Third Circuit rec-
ognized the misuse of the conspiracy statute by federal prosecutors in the
prosecution of NPA offenses:
[T]he preference of some government officials, charged with the enforcement of the
National Prohibition Act, to enforce that law through internal revenue statutes,
of the overt acts committed pursuant to the agreement. The problem, once again is to determine the
scope of the agreement so that the loci of the overt acts may be identified.") (citing Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1912) and Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 76-77 (1905)).
67. See LAFAVE & Scotrr, supra note 65, at 65-66:
[A]ny act or declaration by one co-conspirator committed during and in furtherance of the
conspiracy is admissible against each co-conspirator ... the co-conspirator hearsay exception
as applied often extends beyond that rationale. The requirement that the act or statement be in
furtherance of the conspiracy is often applied broadly, with the result that any evidence some-
how relating to the conspiracy comes in.
See also Goldstein, supra note 16, at 409 n.1 1 ("Statements made by any alleged conspirator are attrib-
uted to his coconspirators on the same basis.") (citing Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 237
(1957); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617-19 (1953); Joseph H. Levie, Hearsay and Conspir-
acy, MICH. L. REv. 1159 (1954)); Russell & Snead, supra note 64, at 757-62 (presenting the evidentiary
and constitutional guidelines governing admissibility of co-conspirators hearsay testimony at trials in-
volving conspiracy charges).
68. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 456 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining
that if the statute of limitations cannot expire while the conspiracy is underway and the conspiracy con-
tinues as long as people are trying to cover up their conduct, then the statute may never run).
[Tihe assumption of an indefinitely continuing offense would result in an indeterminate exten-
sion of the statute of limitations. If the law implies an agreement to cooperate in defeating
prosecution, it must imply that it continues as long as prosecution is a possibility, and prose-
cution is a possibility as long as the conspiracy to defeat it is implied to continue.
Id.; see also Goldstein, supra note 16, at 409 n.l 1 ("The statute of limitations begins to run from the last
overt act committed 'to effect the object of the conspiracy."').
69. United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 662-63 (7th Cir. 1926) (quoting the Report of Circuit
Judges).
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customs laws and the general law of conspiracy found in the Criminal Code, rather
than through the National Prohibition Law itself, thus at times converting misde-
meanors into felonies and hazarding the greater certainty of convictions under the
prohibition law in order to obtain heavier penalties under other laws. Against this
practice the federal judiciary has formally expressed itself.70
As the use of the conspiracy statute to covert misdemeanors into felonies
spread beyond the NPA, other courts condemned the practice in even stronger
terms. In 1941, a federal district court in Kentucky summarized the abuses of
the conspiracy statute:
There has grown up in this country a practice among United States Attorneys to use
18 U.S.C.A. § 88, the so-called conspiracy statute, as a catch-all or dragnet for
everything and everybody, wheresoever found, who might have had some remote
connection with the substantive crime or crimes charged. This most important and
useful criminal statute has been prostituted beyond recognition. There is an attempt
to ensnare not only those enacting the crime but any who might be standing in its
shadow. It has been suggested that this practice grew up under Prohibition and now
is used so extensively that a large percentage of the indictments drawn include a
conspiracy count. Regardless of origin it should not be permitted to flourish.
71
By the 1940s, these cases reflected a growing concern in the federal courts that
the conspiracy statute was being misused by overreaching prosecutors who
were dissatisfied with the misdemeanor punishments that Congress had pre-
scribed for certain federal offenses.
In 1946, concerns with prosecutorial misuse of the conspiracy statute found
their way into an opinion of the United States Supreme Court. In Pinkerton v.
United States,72 the Court decided that a defendant could be prosecuted for
both a completed substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit that of-
fense.73 However, the Court cautioned that the addition of conspiracy counts to
a substantive offense "may at times be abusive and unjust. '74 The Court, quot-
ing the report of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, went on to cite the
"prevalent use of conspiracy indictments for converting a joint misdemeanor
into a felony" as an example of when the addition of conspiracy counts could
be "much abused. 75 Thus, by 1946, even the Supreme Court had expressed
concerns regarding the prosecutorial practice of bringing felony conspiracy
charges for conspiracies to commit offenses that Congress intended to punish
only as misdemeanors.
76
70. United States v. Glass, 25 F.2d 941, 943 (3d. Cir. 1928) (emphasis added).
71. United States v. Moore, 40 F. Supp. 543, 545 (E.D. Ky. 1941).
72. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
73. See id at 643.
74. Id. at 644 n.4.
75. Id.
76. Pinkerton is not the only Supreme Court opinion from that era raising concerns about zealous
prosecutorial use of the federal conspiracy statute. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)
(recognizing that in conspiracy cases, "the liberal rules of evidence and the wide latitude accorded the
prosecution may, and sometimes do, operate unfairly against an individual defendant").
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Congress had taken no action for over twenty years prior to Pinkerton,
during which time federal judges continued to express concerns about the po-
tential for prosecutorial misuse of the conspiracy statute.7 In particular, the
practice of charging misdemeanor conduct as a felony that had been questioned
by the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges in 1925 continued to concern the
federal judiciary. As Justice Jackson observed critically in 1949, "[t]he act of
confederating to commit a misdemeanor, followed by even an innocent overt
act in its execution, is a felony and is such even if the misdemeanor is never
consummated.,
78
D. The 1948 Amendments to the Conspiracy Statute
In 1948 the federal judiciary's two decades of criticism finally yielded re-
sults when Congress amended the federal conspiracy statute as part of an over-
all reorganization of the federal criminal code. The statute as amended permits
a conspiracy to be prosecuted as either a felony or a misdemeanor:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.79
Section 371 defines two separate types of conspiracy offenses: one based on
the "defraud" clause and one based on the "offense" clause.80 A conspiracy "to
defraud the United States," is itself a felony offense punishable by up to five
years imprisonment. A second type of conspiracy crime entails a conspiracy
77. See, e.g., Frankfurt Distilleries, Inc. v. United States, 144 F.2d 824, 835-42 (10th Cir. 1944)
(recognizing the difficulty of defending against a generalized conspiracy charge) (Phillips, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940) (criticizing prosecutors' efforts to
"sweep within the drag-net of conspiracy" everyone associated with an offense); Hartson v. United
States, 14 F.2d 561, 562 (2d Cir. 1926) (criticizing the "cumulation of sentences" that resulted from
prosecutorial use of a conspiracy charge in addition to charges for the underlying substantive offenses).
78. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 449 (1949).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
80. The felony can be a conspiracy to defraud the United States or a conspiracy to commit an of-
fense against the United States. See United States v. Harmas, 974 F.2d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 1992)
("The Statute is written in the disjunctive and should be interpreted as establishing two alternative
means of committing a violation.") (citing United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 781 (11 th Cir. 1989));
see also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1301-1302 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Although it is recog-
nized that the government may not obtain two convictions or punish the defendant twice for the same
conduct by alleging violations of both the defraud and offense clauses of the conspiracy statute, it may
simultaneously prosecute the same conduct under both clauses."); cf United States v. Minarik, 875 U.S.
1186, 1193-94 (6th Cir. 1989) (explaining that section 371 "creates one crime that may be committed in
one of two alternate ways" and that "an individual whose alleged wrongful agreement is covered by the
offense clause ... as well as arguably by the broad defraud clause, cannot be convicted or punished for
both"). The courts have permitted charging violations based on both the offense and defraud clauses in a
single count of an indictment because having more than one object or more than one means does not
convert a single conspiracy into more than one offense. See United States v. Smith, 891 F.2d 703, 711-
12 (9th Cir. 1989) (analyzing authorities); see also United States v. Dale, 782 F. Supp. 615, 617-18
(D.D.C. 1991).
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"to commit any offense against the United States.% A violation of this "of-
fense" clause of the conspiracy statute can be either a felony or a misdemeanor.
The second subsection of the statute explicitly provides that if "the offense, the
commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only,
the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment
provided for such misdemeanor." 81 Thus, a conspiracy to commit a felony of-
fense against the United States is felony, while a conspiracy to commit a mis-
demeanor offense against the United States is a misdemeanor.
82
Although the legislative history to this particular amendment is sparse, the
punishment provision of the offense clause clearly was rewritten to increase the
penalty from two years to five years except where the object of the conspiracy
is a misdemeanor. 83 The Revisers' Notes to the amended statute made clear
that: "If the object is a misdemeanor, the maximum imprisonment for a con-
spiracy to commit that offense, under the revised section cannot exceed one
year."
84
The Revisers' Notes further refer to an address by United States District
Judge Grover M. Moscowitz of the Eastern District of New York, which
pointed out the injustice of permitting a felony punishment on conviction for
conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor. 85 This reference in the Revisers' Notes
suggests that Congress added the misdemeanor punishment provision to end
the practice of felony conspiracy prosecutions for misdemeanor offenses.
Other information in the legislative history also supports this view. Charles
J. Zinn, the committee counsel who assisted with the 1948 amendments to the
criminal code, addressed the American Bar Association section on criminal law
at the ABA annual convention in Cincinnati, Ohio on December 17, 1945. In
discussing the proposed changes to the conspiracy statute, Mr. Zinn explained
that:
In the present law [before the amendment], the general conspiracy statute provides
a punishment of up to two years imprisonment or a fine up to $10,000, or both, re-
gardless of the punishment provided for commission of the offense itself. The result
is that a person convicted of conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor is subject to a
felony penalty, while conviction of a conspiracy to commit a most heinous felony
carries with it the same penalty as conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor.... In the
new code [after the amendment] there is a general conspiracy provision which takes
into consideration the gravity of the substantive crime which is the subject of the
conspiracy.
86
81. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994)
82. See id.
83. See H.R. REP. No. 304 (Reviser's Notes), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), reprinted in 18 U.S.C.
CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE 2476 (West 1948).
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. 92 CONG. REC. A60-A62 (1946) (remarks of Charles J. Zinn, Committee Counsel, regarding
H.R. 2200, 79th Cong.) (emphasis added), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE 2748-51
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Both the legislative history and the judicial criticism that precipitated the 1948
amendment indicate that Congress amended the federal conspiracy statute to
eliminate the practice of prosecuting conspiracies to commit misdemeanors as
felony offenses. Unfortunately, however, the significance of the 1948 amend-
87 8ment to the conspiracy statute seems to have been largely ignored,8  and the
practice of converting misdemeanors into felony conspiracies has recently re-
surfaced, albeit in a new context---election law cases.
89
III. FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION LAW CASES
As Part II demonstrated, the plain language of section 371 as amended in
1948 indicates that Congress intended that a conspiracy to commit an election
law offense, which is a misdemeanor, should be punished as a misdemeanor
conspiracy offense. Not surprisingly, however, federal prosecutors who are
dissatisfied with the misdemeanor punishment Congress has provided for elec-
tion law offenses, 90 have not used the conspiracy statute in this manner. In-
stead, they bring felony conspiracy charges under a "conspiracy to defraud the
United States" theory91 or a conspiracy to commit a felony offense against the
(West 1948).
87. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 701 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1994)).
88. Just over ten years after the 1948 amendment to the statute, a 1959 survey of criminal conspir-
acy law recognized the different objects of a conspiracy contemplated by the offense and defraud
clauses of the federal statute, but it did not address the significance of the misdemeanor offense provi-
sion that Congress added in 1948. See Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 944 (1959).
Moreover, Professor Goldstein, in his exhaustive analysis of the defraud clause, which included an ar-
gument for an "either-or" mutually exclusive construction of the offense and defraud clauses, did not
address the significance of the 1948 amendment either. See Goldstein, supra note 16, at 448-455. The
misdemeanor offense provision of the federal statute was noted but not discussed in a 1961 article on the
Model Penal Code's treatment of criminal conspiracy, in its analysis of the penalty provisions of crimi-
nal conspiracy statutes then in effect. See Herbert Wechsler et. al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in
the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COL. L.
REV. 957, 1026-28 n.365 (1961) ("But if the conspiracy's object is a misdemeanor the penalty shall not
exceed that provided for such misdemeanor.").
89. The practice has been revived despite strong and well-reasoned criticism by the leading com-
mentator of the continued use of the defraud clause where Congress has defined specific offenses. See
generally Goldstein, supra note 16; see also Michael W. Carroll, When Congress Just Says No: Deter-
rence Theory and the Inadequate Enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 84 GEO. L.J. 551,
557 n.52 (1996) (citing both the Curran and Hopkins cases, discussed infra Part III); United States v.
Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The terms 'conspiracy' and 'defraud' when used together
have a 'peculiar susceptibility to a kind of tactical manipulation which shields from view very real in-
fringements on basic values of our criminal law.") (citing Goldstein, supra note 16, at 409).
90. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 69-75; see also Carroll, supra note 89, at 588 n.49 ("Pre-
sumably, the difficulty here is that careerist concerns for prosecutors and allocation of prosecutorial re-
sources make securing a misdemeanor conviction [for an election law offense] an insufficient incentive
for the effort required in proving a malum in se activity.").
91. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 109.
The "conspiracy to defraud" approach to FECA crimes is based on Hammerschmidt v. United
States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924), which held that a conspiracy to defraud the United States under
section 371 includes a conspiracy "to interfere with or obstruct one of [the federal govern-
ment's] lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft, or trickery, or at least be means that
are dishonest."
Prosecutorial Misuse of the Federal Conspiracy Statute
United States by causing campaign officials to file false statements with the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.92 Analy-
sis of recent case law demonstrates that the courts do not clearly support such
expansive application of the conspiracy statute in garden variety cases, and that
judges and juries may be reining in the worst prosecutorial abuses by imposing
very high burdens of proof.
A. Historical Primer on the Criminal Provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act
The federal statutes regulating campaign fundraising are a relatively recent
addition to the federal regulatory scheme. Prior to enacting the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act (FECA) 93 in 1971, Congress had made only sporadic at-
tempts to regulate political fundraising and federal elections, usually in re-
sponse to widely publicized scandals. 94 Between 1868 and 1870 Congress
enacted a number of election laws known collectively as the Enforcement
Acts.95 These laws prohibited a variety of corrupt and fraudulent practices with
respect to elections-including bribery, falsification of voting returns, false
registration, and interference with election officers.96 Congress repealed almost
all of these laws in 1894.97
Congress next attempted to regulate elections by enacting the Tillman Act
in 1907.98 That Act prohibited national banks and corporations from contrib-
uting to campaigns for federal office.9 9 In 1910 Congress imposed campaign
This conspiracy theory, as applied to the functioning of the FEC, is as follows: The FEC, an
agency of the United States, has two principal statutory duties, to enforce the FECA's cam-
paign financing and disclosure requirements, and to provide the public with accurate informa-
tion regarding the source and use of contributions to federal candidates. To perform these du-
ties the FEC must receive accurate information from the candidates and political committees
required to file reports. A scheme to infuse patently illegal funds into a federal campaign, such
as by using conduits or other means calculated to conceal the illegal source of the contribu-
tion, thus disrupts and impedes the FEC in the performance of its statutory duties.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 567 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he government used [18
U.S.C.] section 2(b) in conjunction with [18 U.S.C.] section 1001 to charge defendant with causing the
campaign treasurers to file false reports. Section 2(b) prohibits 'willfully caus[ing] an act to be done
which if directly performed by... another would be an offense against the United States .. .
93. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971).
94. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in Search
of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 279, 280 (1991) (discussing the history of campaign finance regu-
lation).
95. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1840; see also DOJ
MANUAL, supra note 1, at 19.
96. See supra note 94.
97. See supra note 94. United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 482-85 (1917), discussed supra
Section II.A., reviews the history leading up to the 1894 repeal.
98. See S. REP. No. 92-229 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1841.
99. See id.
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contribution disclosure requirements on interstate political committees. 100 In
1925 Congress combined these provisions to form part of the Corrupt Practices
Act. 1 1 The Corrupt Practices Act purported to provide a comprehensive
scheme for regulating federal elections, but its enforcement provisions proved
to be ineffective. 1°2 Most of the violations of the act were unintentional, and
because the Act provided only for criminal penalties, it failed to reach the ma-
jority of violations.'0 3
In 1971 Congress enacted the FECA to provide for comprehensive regula-
tion of campaign fmancing by imposing on candidates spending limits and
various disclosure requirements.' 0 4 The FECA also provided for both civil and
criminal enforcement of its provisions. 1
05
In 1974, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, Congress amended the
FECA by imposing limits on individual contributions and by creating the Fed-
eral Election Commission.' °6 In 1976 the Supreme Court struck down portions
of the FECA on First Amendment grounds.'0 7 In response, Congress again
amended the statute. 108 Although the 1976 amendments were designed primar-
ily to comply with the Supreme Court's constitutional directives, it appears that
Congress also had other objectives. Before 1976 criminal election law offenses
were punishable as felonies. 109 In the 1976 amendments, however, Congress
reduced the penalty for these offenses to misdemeanors, 1° limited criminal
prosecution to "knowing and willful" violations,' and imposed a relatively
short three-year statute of limitations. 112 Congress also removed the criminal
enforcement provisions from Title 18 of the United States Code, the Title that
contains the general federal criminal statutes, and consolidated them with the
FECA's civil provisions in a single provision in Title 2.113
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Kenneth A. Gross and Ki P. Hong, The Criminal and Civil Enforcement of Campaign Fi-
nance Laws, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 51, 54 (1998).
103. See id.
104. See United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 39 (D.D.C. 1998) (summarizing the legislative
history of the FECA), rev'don other grounds, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
105. See id.
106. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263;
Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
107. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976).
108. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475.
109. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 610 (contributions by national banks, labor organizations and corpora-
tions), 611 (contributions by government contractors), 613 (contributions by foreign nationals) (1975),
repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475.
110. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A) (1976).
11. Id.
112. See id. The legislative history does not explain why the limitations period was changed; it just
states that the House Amendment to the 1974 Act provided a three-year limitations period while
"[u]nder existing law the period of limitations is 5 years." 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668.
113. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441h (1994) (formerly 18 U.S.C. §§ 608, 610-617). Prior to the 1976
amendments, all FECA violations were subject to criminal prosecution under a misdemeanor provision
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B. Prosecution Theories in Election Law Cases
Under DOJ policy, before a criminal case based upon alleged FECA viola-
tions can be brought, the facts must reveal some type of "aggravating factor"
that would warrant converting the case from an FEC civil proceeding to a
criminal prosecution. 14 The Department of Justice manual on federal prosecu-
tion of election offenses states that "[m]ost violations of the FECA and the
public financing provisions of Title 26 are handled civilly by the FEC.""' 5
Without the existence of an aggravating factor, a criminal case is not warranted
and "[c]ivil enforcement is clearly appropriate for FECA violations that in-
volve small amounts of money, or that are committed openly and in obvious
ignorance of the law.' 116 Criminal prosecutions under the FECA are the ex-
ception, not the rule, and only "intentional and factually aggravated violations
of the FECA are crimes, subject to prosecution by the Justice Department."'"17
In other words, only the existence of aggravating factors will convert a typical
civil FECA case into a criminal prosecution, and consequently, "only those
FECA violations that are committed knowingly and willfully and involve at
least $2000 are crimes.""l 8 In a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU")
between the DOJ and FEC, both agencies acknowledged that not even all
that required no criminal intent. See 2 U.S.C. § 441 (Supp. 1972) (repealed); United States v. Hsia, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 33, 41 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also DOJ
MANUAL, supra note 1, at 107. One federal appellate court had held that a criminal conviction under
this provision required proof of "knowing" conduct by the defendant. See United States v. Finance
Committee to Re-Elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also DOJ MANUAL,
supra note 1, at 107. In the 1976 amendments Congress made nonwillful violations subject to civil en-
forcement by the FEC and made knowing and willful violations that involved $2000 or more in a calen-
dar year subject to both FEC civil enforcement and criminal prosecution by the Department of Justice as
misdemeanor offenses. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 107.
114. The DOJ Manual does not identify specific "aggravating factors" than make criminal prose-
cution appropriate for offenses that otherwise would be subject to civil enforcement, but it does state
that "FECA violations will most likely warrant criminal prosecution where they involve schemes to in-
fluence a federal candidate's election by making contributions that are patently illegal, through means
calculated to conceal the scheme from the FEC and the public." DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 7. This
explanation of when an offense should be prosecuted criminally is not entirely satisfying, however, as it
would seem that any instance of making a contribution in the name of another, in violation of 2 U.S.C. §
441f, would meet this test. The DOJ Manual also states, "A campaign financing violation is generally
prosecuted criminally only if it is a willful violation of a core provision of the FECA..., involved a
substantial sum of money, and resulted in the reporting of false campaign information to the FEC." Id. at
93. Again, this test is not as helpful as it might first appear-the only factor listed that represents a sig-
nificant limitation on criminal prosecution is the "substantial sum of money" requirement. The DOJ
Manual does not define what "substantial" means in this context, however. To confuse matters even
more, the DOJ Manual also states, "If a campaign financing offense violates one of the core prohibitions
of the FECA, and is willful, aggravated in amount, and concealed from the public, the Justice Depart-
ment may pursue it as a conspiracy to defraud the United States, under 18 U.S.C. § 371, or as a false
statement, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001-both felonies." Id. at 13 (emphasis added). It is difficult to see how
these policy statements provide any meaningful guidance notice as to when offenses will be prosecuted
criminally, either as misdemeanors or as felonies.
115. Id.
116. Id at 107.
117. Idat93.
118. Idat95.
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knowing and willful violations of the FEC should be prosecuted criminally:
The Commission and the Department mutually recognize that all violations of the
Federal Election Campaign Act and the antifraud provisions of Chapters 95 and 96
of the Internal Revenue Code, even those committed knowingly and willfull'Amay
not be proper subjects for prosecution as crimes under 2 U.S.C. § 441 [j] ....
The problem, however, is not in the selection of violations that warrant
criminal charges-it is with the manner in which the Department of Justice
prosecutes those violations that are selected for criminal prosecution. Federal
prosecutors often utilize other felony criminal provisions in Title 18 to avoid
the misdemeanor penalties contained in 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A) and the
shorter three-year statute of limitations that Congress specified for federal
election law offenses.' 20 In fact, the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice, which is responsible for overseeing
prosecutions of election law offenses, 121 explicitly advances "Felony theories
for FECA prosecutions" in its manual on Federal Prosecution of Election Of-
fenses. 122 The focus of these alternative felony theories for election law prose-
cutions is 18 U.S.C. § 371, the federal conspiracy statute, often used in con-
junction with 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the federal false statements statute.123
The Justice Department can invoke a number of federal criminal statutes to
bring felony charges in campaign finance cases. Prosecutors charging indi-
viduals involved in illegal campaign contribution schemes can use a wide vari-
ety of felony federal criminal statutes including, but not limited to: false state-
ments,' 24 false entries in the books and records of a bank, 125 misapplication of
bank funds, 126 money laundering, 127 bank fraud, 128 mail fraud, 129 and wire
119. 43 Fed. Reg. 5441 (1978); see also DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 120.
120. Title 2 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that "[n]o person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for
any violation of subchapter I of this chapter, unless the indictment is found or the information is insti-
tuted within 3 years after the date of the violation." 2 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994). Most other offenses con-
tained within the federal criminal code are subject to five-year statute of limitations except for certain
specified violations involving financial institutions, which are subject to a ten-year statute of limitations.
121. See DOJ Manual, supra note 1, at 13. Local United States Attorneys' Offices and Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation field offices can conduct "preliminary investigations" of election law violations
without consulting the Public Integrity Section. Id. at 14.
122. See id. at 108. It is noteworthy that the 1995 sixth edition of the DOJ Manual contains three
pages of discussion of "Felony Theories for FECA Prosecutions," while its predecessor, the 1988 fifth
edition, contains only a little over one page on "Alternative Prosecutive Theories for FECA offenses."
See CRAIG C. DONSATO, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 75 (5th ed. 1988). The 1984
fourth edition contains no discussion of felony theories. See CRAIG C. DONSATO, FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES (4th ed. 1984). This increased focus on felony prosecution theo-
ries appears to reflect the DOJ's steadily expanding efforts to pursue such theories in election law cases.
123. See DOJ Manual supra note 1, at 108; see also infra Subsection III.B.3 (discussing the use of
false statements charges in election law cases).
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
125. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1005-1006.
126. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 656-657.
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
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fraud. 130 Prosecutors cannot charge these felony offenses in every election law
case, however, because they require the government to prove additional ele-
ments t ' beyond the core conduct that constitutes an election law violation. But
thanks in large measure to the federal courts' expansive interpretation of the
federal conspiracy statute, 132 aggressive prosecutors can allege the elements of
a conspiracy offense, by contrast, in almost any election law case. 133
C. Analysis of Recent Election Law Conspiracy Decisions
Consistent with Congressional intent in the 1948 amendments to the con-
spiracy statute, severe limitations should be imposed on its use in election law
cases. Analysis of recent case law suggests that such limits are being imposed
by judges and juries, but only implicitly and on a case-by-case basis, often by
imposing high burdens of proof at trial. These limits are steps in the right di-
rection, but they are inadequate to address the core problem of prosecutorial
overreaching. Most cases are resolved by plea bargains before trial, and a de-
fendant should not be forced to go through an expensive and wrenching legal
process to defend against a charge that never should have been brought in the
first place. Instead, Justice Department policy should preclude bringing felony
conspiracy charges in garden variety conduit contribution cases, and courts
should not hesitate to dismiss indictments that charge felony conspiracies in
such cases.
Federal appellate courts have allowed felony conspiracy charges in cam-
paign finance cases involving schemes to defraud the government that ex-
tended well beyond simple "garden variety" election law violations. These
cases entailed such aggravating factors as the use of federally insured funds to
make contributions, the laundering of the funds and, most important, the inter-
ference or obstruction of specific governmental functions other than campaign
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
131. See generally JOEL ANDROPHY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME §§ 8.01, 10.05, 11.01[1], 11.02[2],
11.04[1], 21.04[2], 22.02 (1992) (explaining the elements of various white collar crimes).
For example, the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements) are:
(1) a false statement (which can be written or oral, sworn or unsworn, voluntary or required
by law, signed or unsigned) or concealment by failure to fully disclose required infor-
mation;
(2) involving a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch
of the United States government;
(3) that is material (judged by the capability of the statement to influence governmental ac-
tivity); and
(4) that is made knowingly and willfully (although the statement need not be made directly
to the governmental entity and the defendant need not know of the governmental entity's
jurisdiction).
See id. § 21.04[2].
132. See supra Section H.A.
133. Cf DOJ MANuAL, supra note 1, at 109 (recognizing that charging election law cases under
felony theories "requires proof of additional elements beyond those required by the FECA's misde-
meanor provision").
Yale Law & Policy Review
expenditure reporting. Although these cases are markedly different and more
egregious, federal prosecutors repeatedly rely on them to support their charging
policies in garden variety conduit contribution cases. The government's posi-
tion is misguided, the cases they rely upon are clearly distinguishable, and they
should not be used to justify the pattern of charging simple election law cases
as felony conspiracies.
1. The seminal case: United States v. Hopkins.
Despite the clear language of the misdemeanor offense clause of section
371, federal courts have permitted prosecutors to bring felony conspiracy
charges based on election law violations in particularly egregious situations. In
the seminal case of United States v. Hopkins,134 the defendants, officers and
directors of a federally insured savings and loan association, used their institu-
tion's funds to reimburse employees for contributions made to various political
candidates and organizations. Instead of relying on the criminal provisions
contained in section 437g(d) of the FECA to prosecute the illegal campaign
contributions, the prosecutors charged the defendants with numerous felony
counts of conspiracy, misapplication of thrift funds, false entries in the thrift's
books and records, and knowingly and willfully causing another to conceal
material facts from the FEC.135 As these charges suggest, Hopkins involved
more than simple conduit campaign contributions. The presence of conduct
that interferes with governmental functions-here, federal regulation of finan-
cial institutions-arguably made a conspiracy to defraud the United States
charge appropriate in Hopkins even though it clearly would not be appropriate
in garden-variety election law violation cases that involve only conduit contri-
butions or unlawful use of corporate funds to make contributions.'
36
The Hopkins court primarily focused its attention on whether the govern-
ment had met its burden of proof on the conspiracy charge.137 The court con-
cluded that there was ample evidence to show that the defendants "knew that
their conduct was illegal and unauthorized, and that they intended to interfere
with the proper functioning of at least three federal agencies."' 138 This evidence
satisfied the court that "the Government adequately proved the necessary ele-
ments of the [conspiracy] offense charged under § 371 .
Exactly what kind of conspiracy the court was discussing is less clear,
134. 916 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1990).
135. Seeid. at211 nn.2-5.
136. Cf U.S. v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 1998) (refusing to dismiss a conspiracy charge
when the allegations in the indictment included interference with the functions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, as well as garden-variety election law violations), rev'd on other grounds, 176
F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
137. See Hopkins, 916 F.2d at 213.
138. Id.
139. Jd. at214.
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however. In a footnote, the court said, "[t]he Hopkins were not charged with
violating the election laws or conspiring to violate them; they were charged,
among other things, with conspiring to commit an offense under § 371."' 140 In
the same footnote the court explained that "the evidence was sufficient to show
that the Hopkins knew that corporations could not make political contributions,
and that their scheme to disguise corporate contributions as individual contri-
butions would interfere with the proper reporting of campaign contributions to
the FEC. That evidence is sufficient to sustain their conviction under § 371."141
As these quotations show, the court was not precise in its characterization
of the section 371 conspiracy charge. 142 Contrary to the court's assertion that
the Hopkinses were charged with committing an offense against the United
States under section 371,1 43 the charging theory the court seems to have ap-
proved was conspiracy to defraud the United States by interfering with the
proper functioning of the FEC and other federal agencies.'44 The Hopkins court
probably saw no need to distinguish between the defraud clause and the of-
fense clause in its review of the conspiracy charge because the law was well-
settled that a violation of both prongs of the conspiracy statute could be
charged in a single count of an indictment.
145
After approving the felony conspiracy charges, the Hopkins court turned its
attention to the question of whether the "defendants should have been prose-
cuted only under the federal election laws (which create only misdemeanors),"
and not under the felony provisions of the federal criminal code.1 4 6 The court
140. Id. at 214 n.7.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 213 ("Having presented ample proof of an agreement between the defendants, the
next question is whether the Government also satisfactorily proved the defendants' intent to commit an
offense against, or defraud the United States.") (emphasis added).
143. The court discusses the conspiracy charge in a section of the opinion that follows the heading
"Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States," but in the first sentence of that discus-
sion describes Count I of the indictments as charging the defendants with "conspiracy to defraud or
commit an offense against the United States." Id. at 212.
144. See id. at 213. Other courts have been more precise in analyzing the purpose of the conspirato-
rial agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Haga, 821 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1987) (reversing conspir-
acy conviction where the indictment charged a violation of the offense clause (only) and the district
court's conclusions of law found a violation of the defraud clause); United States v. Rosenblatt, 554
F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the government must prove agreement between the alleged co-
conspirators "with respect to the essential nature of the alleged fraud" because "just as the particular
offense must be specified under the 'offense' branch ... the fraudulent scheme must be alleged and
proved under the conspiracy-to-defraud clause").
145. See United States v. Smith, 891 F.2d 703, 712-13 (9th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases and holding
that charging violations of both clauses of the conspiracy statute in a single count is not duplicitous); see
also May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (ruling that the conspiracy statute cre-
ates a single offense). The fact that charging violations of both clauses of the conspiracy statute in a sin-
gle count is not duplicitous does not, however, mean that a felony conspiracy to defraud charge should
be permitted when the underlying conduct is a misdemeanor offense and there is no evidence that the
object of the conspiracy was to obstruct or impede governmental functions. This distinction is discussed
in greater detail below.
146. See Hopkins, 916 F.2d at 218-19.
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dismissed this argument as "meritless" because "[i]t is well settled that 'when
an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute
under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defen-
dants."', 147 The court recognized that an exception to this rule applies where
Congress clearly intended that one statute supplant another, although the mere
fact that one statute is more specific than the other is not sufficient to invoke
that exception. 14 Focusing on the federal election laws, the Hopkins court con-
cluded that there is no indication that Congress intended that those laws should
supplant the general federal criminal statutes in Title 18.149
Although this conclusion is correct with respect to the effect of the passage
of the federal election laws on the general provisions of the federal criminal
code, in focusing on the intent of Congress when enacting the federal election
laws the Hopkins court failed to consider the intent of Congress in amending
the federal conspiracy statute in 1948.150 For the reasons discussed in Part II,
the legislative history of the 1948 amendments indicates that Congress in-
tended to curtail the practice of prosecutors using the conspiracy statute to
punish conduct that constitutes a misdemeanor offense under other federal
statutes. 15 The Hopkins opinion does not address the significance of the 1948
amendment to the conspiracy statute, and most courts that have reviewed con-
spiracy charges in election law cases since Hopkins also have failed to do so.
1 52
147. Id. at 218 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979)).
148. See id. (citing United States v. Zabel, 702 F.2d 704, 707-08 (8th Cir. 1983)).
149. See id. at218.
150. This is not to suggest that Hopkins was wrongly decided. Although the opinion's analysis of
the conspiracy charge does not clearly distinguish between a conspiracy to defraud the United States and
a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, the court seems to have been approving the
former based upon the facts before the court. Those facts demonstrated that officials of a federally
regulated savings and loan institution engaged in activities that had the effect of impairing and impeding
the activities of at least three federal regulatory agencies, including the FEC. See id. at 213. The Hopkins
court concluded that a rational jury could well have inferred from the evidence that the defendants in-
tended to interfere with the proper functioning of two federal savings and loan regulatory agencies. See
id at 214. This evidence may well have been sufficient to support a charge of conspiracy to defraud the
United States by impairing or impeding lawful government functions. Hopkins should not, however, be
read to stand for the proposition that a case involving nothing more than garden-variety election law
violations, such as reimbursements of political contributions or the use of corporate funds to make po-
litical contributions, will always support a defraud clause felony conspiracy charge. Cf. United States v.
Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (refusing to dismiss a conspiracy charge when the allegations
in the indictment included interference with the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
as well as garden-variety election law violations), rev'd on other grounds, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Unfortunately, the Department of Justice does just that when it relies on Hopkins to support con-
spiracy charges in garden-variety conduit contribution cases.
151. See supra Section II.C.
152. One federal court has criticized another aspect of the Hopkins court's analysis. In United
States v. Nichols, Criminal No. 98-642 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1988), the court disagreed with "the passage
in Hopkins stating that '[tihe jury was entitled to infer from the defendants' elaborate scheme for dis-
guising their corporate contributions that the defendants deliberately conveyed information they knew to
be false to the [FEC]."' The Nichols court set a higher bar for conduct that would support a felony false
statements charge: "Although the Defendants' 'elaborate scheme' certainly suggests that they knew their
conduct was generally improper, that conduct is insufficient in itself to establish that the Defendants
were sufficiently versed in the minutia of FECA regulations so as to understand that the treasurers' re-
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The result has been a failure to scrutinize closely the Department of Justice's
use of the Hopkins precedent to support conspiracy to defraud the United
States charges in more mundane conduit contribution cases - a use that appears
contrary to the legislative intent of the 1948 amendments.
2. The Neglected Case: United States v. Minarik
Just before the Hopkins appeal was decided, another federal appeals court
considered the issue of whether prosecutors should be permitted to bring felony
conspiracy charges based on conduct that otherwise would constitute a misde-
meanor offense in the context of the federal tax laws. United States v.
Minarik53 involved charges brought under the defraud clause of the conspiracy
statute.15 4 The defendants were charged with conspiring to defraud the United
States by concealing assets from the Internal Revenue Service after receiving
notice of assessment for taxes owed.' 55 The Minarik court undertook a detailed
analysis of the defraud clause 156 but commenced its analysis with the premise
that the "stingy" legislative history of the clause would not provide any guid-
ance on the scope of the statute. 57 Thus the Minarik court, like the Hopkins
court a few months later, did not consider the legislative intent of the 1948
amendments that added the misdemeanor offense clause to the statute.
Although it did not explictly discuss the 1948 amendments, the Minarik
court did recognize the potential for misuse of the conspiracy statute if a prose-
cutor ignores the misdemeanor offense clause and instead proceeds under the
felony defraud clause so as to obtain a felony conviction:
[I]f conspiracy agreements the object of which fall under a specific offense defined
by Congress are allowed to be prosecuted under the "defraud" clause, the purpose
of the misdemeanor offense provision of § 371 will be defeated. That provision says
that when the "offense... which is the object of the conspiracy" is a misdemeanor,
the punishment under § 371 must be limited to the punishment provided for the
misdemeanor. Congressional intent will be defeated if the government can prose-
cute under the defraud clause conduct which Congress has isolated and defined as a
misdemeanor.1
58
While this warning was well-reasoned and in accordance with the intent of
Congress when it amended the statute in 1948, it nonetheless suffered from two
shortcomings. First, it was not supported by any citations to the legislative
ports were literally false." United States v. Nichols, Criminal No. 98-642, Opinion of Dec. 7, 1998 at 6
n. 5 (C.D. Cal.). Cf. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (dismissing false statements charges because of "[tihe
remoteness of [the defendant's] position in relation to the FEC, the case law with respect to 'literal
truth,' the fact that a check is not a statement, and the willful intent hurdle")'.
153. 875 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1989).
154. Seeid. at 1186.
155. Seeid. at l187.
156. Seeid. at 1190-94.
157. See id. at 1190 (citing Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 131 (1987)).
158. Id. at 1194.
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history of the 1948 amendments, even though the Revisers' Notes support the
court's analysis. 159 Second, the Minarik court's conclusion that the felony de-
fraud clause should not be used to punish a conspiracy to commit a misde-
meanor was mere dictum.16
0
The Minarik court's analysis went well beyond the import of the misde-
meanor offense clause of the conspiracy statute. Focusing on the inherent am-
biguity of the defraud clause, the court argued that the judiciary has a responsi-
bility to prevent that clause from expanding to the point that it "obliterat[es] the
carefully drawn relationship between [the statute's] two clauses."'16 1 Applying
this precept to the facts before it, the court held that in an area where the law is
as "technical and difficult to discern" as compliance with tax law, the existence
of "a Congressional statute closely defining those duties takes a conspiracy to
avoid them out of the defraud clause and places it in the offense clause."'
' 62
This conclusion, placing a restriction on the scope of the defraud clause, is
at odds with the reasoning of the Hopkins court. The permissive Hopkins ap-
proach has attracted the greater following, however. Although Minarik has not
been reversed, it certainly has not been embraced, even in its own circuit.
163
Following the lead of Hopkins, most courts that have reviewed prosecutors'
use of the conspiracy statute to bring felony charges in cases involving election
law violations have accepted the Department of Justice's "felony theories for
FECA prosecutions."' 164 That is not to say, however, that the government's ef-
forts to apply these theories has been uniformly successful. The small body of
case law that has developed since Hopkins reflects a growing consensus that
the existence of election law offenses alone is not sufficient to support a felony
conspiracy charge and that additional elements must be alleged and proved by
the prosecution to support such charges. As the discussion of the case law that
follows demonstrates, if the government fails to supply these additional ele-
ments of proof, the defendants are likely to be acquitted or the conviction
overturned on appeal. This may reflect the beginning of a modem trend away
from permitting prosecutors to overcharge using the conspiracy statute and
could, if it continues, curtail prosecutorial misuse of the conspiracy statute in
election law cases.
159. See supra Section II.C.
160. In Minarik the specific offense that the defendants could have been charged with committing
was concealment of assets in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(4), which by its terms is a felony offense.
See Minarik, 875 F.2d at 1187.
161. Id. at 1193. Cf Goldstein, supra note 16, at 408.
162. Minarik, 875 F.2d at 1196.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases in the Sixth
Circuit and elsewhere that have limited Minarik to its facts).
164. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 108.
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3. Cases since Hopkins and Minarik.
United States v. Curran165 is a classic example of a case where the gov-
ernment charged conduct squarely covered by the misdemeanor election laws
as felony conspiracy and false statements offenses. 166 The defendant, Curran,
was charged with reimbursing his employees for campaign contributions to
federal candidates that he supported.167 Rather than charging Curran with elec-
tion law offenses, however, the government charged him with causing the can-
didates' campaign treasurer to submit false reports to the FEC, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) and 1001,168 and with conspiracy to defraud the United
States by impeding the FEC's performance "through obstruction and interfer-
ence with the Commission's reporting requirements, and by causing fictitious
statements to be made on reports required to be sent to the Commission."'
' 69
A jury found the defendant guilty on both the felony conspiracy and false
statements counts, and he appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. 170 The Third Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial because the jury charge on the false statements count-
that the defendant had a legal duty to disclose to the FTC the name of the
actual contributors--"was a clear error of law."'' 7 The Third Circuit held that
with respect to the false statements count, the government had the burden of
proving that defendant was aware that the campaign treasurers were bound by
the law to accurately report the actual source of the contributions to the
Commission, that the defendant's actions were taken with the specific intent to
cause the treasurers to submit a report that did not accurately provide the
relevant information, and that the defendant knew that his actions were un-
lawful.
172
With respect to conspiracy to defraud the United States, however, the Third
Circuit did not question or criticize the charging theory; it merely noted that the
charging error on the defendant's legal duty to disclose "undermined not only
the substantive counts, but the conspiracy one as well."'173 The Department of
Justice thus cites the opinion as implicitly approving the government's felony
165. 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994).
166. Unlike Hopkins, however, Curran involved no allegations of other substantive federal felony
offenses. Cf United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (refusing to dismiss a conspir-
acy charge when the allegations in the indictment included interference with the functions of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, as well as garden-variety election law violations), rev'd on other
grounds, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
167. See Curran, 20 F.3d at 562-63. This conflict fits precisely the offenses specified by Congress
for contributions in the name of another, as well as exceeding contribution limits and use of corporate
funds, if corporate funds are used to reimburse an employee. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a, 441b, 441f(1994).
168. 20 F.3d at 563.
169. Id. at 571.
170. See id at 563.
171. Id. at 570.
172. Id. at 570-71.
173. Id. at 571.
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conspiracy charging theory. 174
The Third Circuit acknowledged that the defendant's conduct "could have
established the basis for misdemeanor convictions under the [Federal] Election
Campaign Act," but candidly acknowledged that the government instead pur-
sued felony charges "[b]ecause the Act's [three year] statute of limitations had
expired."' 175 Relying in large measure on Hopkins, the appeals court rejected
the defendant's argument that "because it targets specific conduct, the [Fed-
eral] Election Campaign Act supersedes the more general criminal provisions
of Title 18. "176 The court did, however, concede that this argument "has a cer-
tain logic and sense of fairness to it in view of the fact that the Federal Election
Campaign Act was designed to prevent the underlying conduct that makes the
defendant vulnerable in this case.' 77
Logic and fairness did not prevail, however. The court focused on the false
statements charge and reviewed both the legislative history of the FECA and
case law involving the use of the false statements statute where other specific
federal statutes also applied to the conduct at issue. The court concluded that
because there was no "express evidence" that the election laws were "intended
to preempt the general criminal provisions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b), 371, or
1001," the government was free to pursue the felony charges even though
Congress had enacted misdemeanor offenses that applied to the conduct at is-
sue. 1
7 8
Even though the Curran court approved the prosecution's felony prosecu-
tion theories, it placed a heavy burden on felony charge prosecution in a cam-
paign contributions case. The court began its analysis of the false statements
charge by observing that "[section 1001] proscribes two different types of con-
duct: concealment of material facts and false representations.' ' 179 To convict on
a concealment theory the prosecution must prove that a defendant had a legal
duty to disclose the information in question at the time of the alleged conceal-
ment. 80 The court concluded that the defendant could not be guilty of con-
cealment under section 1001 because he had no duty to disclose information to
the FEC-that duty rests with the campaigns that receive contributions.'
8
'
Having disposed of the concealment theory, the court turned to the question
174. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 93.
175. Curran, 20 F.3d at 566.
176. Id at 565.
177. Id. Arguably the court's analysis addressed only half the question, however. Even if the court
is correct on the FECA preemption point, there is ample evidence that Congress did not intend for the
felony provisions of Section 371 to be used when the underlying conduct is a conspiracy to commit a
misdemeanor offense. In fact, as the legislative history suggests, the Revisers' Notes suggest that the
1948 amendment to Section 371 was intended to avoid just that result. See supra Section II.C.
178. Curran, 20 F.3d at 566.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. Seeid. at567.
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of whether the defendant could be convicted of making a false statement. The
difficulty faced by the government under a false statements theory of prosecu-
tion was that the defendant did not prepare or file any reports with the FEC;
again, it is the campaign, not the contributor, that files reports with the FEC.1
2
The government attempted to "bridge that gap" by using 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) 183 to
charge the defendant with deliberately causing another person to perform an
act (the filing of inaccurate reports with the FEC) that violated section 1001.184
This theory prompted the court to analyze the application of the intent re-
quirement of section 2(b) in a false statements charge under section 1001.
The court first recognized that a defendant charged with causing another to
file a false report with a federal agency "can be convicted even if the interme-
diary was unaware that the report was false."'185 The focus in such cases is on
the mental state of the accused, not the mental state of the intermediary who
filed the report. Here, the court explained, the prosecution faces a heavy bur-
den:
When proceeding under section 2(b) in tandem with section 1001, the government
must prove that a defendant caused the intermediary to make false statements. The
intent element differs from that needed when the prosecution proceeds directly un-
der section 1001. The prosecution must not only show that a defendant had the req-
uisite intent under section 1001 (deliberate action with knowledge that the state-
ments were not true), but must also prove that he "willfully" caused the false
representations to be made.1
86
The critical question is what constitutes "willfulness" in that context. A recent
Supreme Court decision provided the Curran court with the answer to that
question.
In Ratzlafv. United States'87 the Supreme Court held that to obtain a crimi-
nal conviction of a defendant for a willful violation of the anti-structuring'
s8
provisions of the Money Laundering Control Act' 89 the government must
182. See id. at 567.
183. Section 2(b) provides that "[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a princi-
pal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994).
184. Curran, 20 F.3d at 567.
185. Id. at 567 (citing United States v. American Investors of Pittsburgh, 879 F.2d 1087, 1097 (3d
Cir. 1989)).
186. Id. at 567-68.
187. 510U.S. 135 (1994).
188. The government argued that structuring was not the kind of activity that an ordinary person
would engage in innocently and that it was therefore reasonable to hold a structurer responsible for
evading the reporting requirements without the need to prove specific knowledge that such evasion is
unlawful. In response to that argument the Court stated that "currency structuring is not inevitably ne-
farious .... Nor is a person who structures a currency transaction invariably motivated by a desire to
keep the Government in the dark" Id. at 144-45. The Court went on to say that "we are unpersuaded by
the argument that structuring is so obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness' requirement
is satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring. Had Congress
wished to dispense with the requirement, it could have furnished the appropriate instruction." Id. at 146.
189. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a), 5324 (1994).
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prove that defendant knew that the structuring activity in which he engaged
was unlawful.' 90 In other words, it is not sufficient to show that a defendant
structured transactions and did so with knowledge of, and a purpose to avoid,
the banks' reporting requirement.191 The prosecution must also prove that the
defendant knew his conduct was unlawful. It was this heavy burden 192 that the
Curran court applied to the false statements charge, concluding that
"[a]lthough the defendant in Ratzlaf was not charged with violations of sec-
tions 2(b) and 1001, we find nothing in the Court's discussion of willfulness
that would confine the rationale to the currency reporting statute."'
193
The rationale in Ratzlaf was that the practice of structuring cash deposits
"is not inevitably nefarious," 194 and the Curran court reached the same conclu-
sion about making political contributions in the name of another. The Curran
court based this conclusion on three similarities between structuring offenses
and election law offenses: (1) both involve the defendant's knowledge of a
third party's duty to disclose information to a government agency; (2) both in-
volve underlying conduct that is not "obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad"'; 95
and (3) both involved conduct made illegal by a regulatory statute.' 96 These
similarities led the Curran court to apply the Ratzlaf rationale and hold that in
felony false statements cases based on election law reporting offenses, the
prosecution must prove that the defendant "knew of the campaign treasurer's
reporting obligations, that he attempted to frustrate those obligations, and that
he knew his conduct was unlawful."' 197 As the Ratzlaf dissent observed with
respect to the structuring offenses at issue in that case, by requiring proof of
actual knowledge of illegality, this burden as a practical matter makes felony
false statements prosecutions for election law offenses difficult.' 
98
The Curran holding is consistent with an earlier, unreported decision,
190. SeeRatzlaf5lOU.S.at 149.
191. See id. at 140.
192. The dissent in Ratzlafemphasized the difficulty of the burden the decision places on prosecu-
tors, observing that "as a practical matter [the decision] largely nullifies the effect of the [antistructur-
ing] provision," because "requiring proof of actual knowledge of illegality will make prosecution for
structuring difficult or impossible in most cases."" Id. at 161-162 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This is the
burden the Curran court placed on prosecutors who seek felony false statements charges in election law
cases.
193. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 568 (3rd Cir. 1994).
194. Ratzlaf 510 U.S. at 144. Cf United States v. Minarik, 875 F.2d 1186, 1196 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding that in an area where the law is as "technical and difficult to discern" as compliance with tax
law, the existence of "a Congressional statute closely defining those duties takes a conspiracy to avoid
them out of the defraud clause and places it in the offense clause").
195. Curran, 20 F.3d at 569. The Curran court added: "We see little difference between breaking a
cash transaction into segments of less than $10,000 and making a contribution in the name of another."
Id.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See supra note 194. Cf. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 109 ("Proving these additional ele-
ments may be difficult in campaign financing cases.").
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United States v. Mandarich,99 a 1992 case involving felony conspiracy
charges based on FECA violations. In 1992, Judge Richard P. Matsch dis-
missed a conspiracy and false statements case200 at the conclusion of the prose-
cution's presentation of evidence, 20 1 before the defense even had presented its
case, because the government failed to present evidence of a sufficient level of
intent on the part of the defendant.20 2 Judge Matsch explained to the jury that
he was dismissing the case against the defendant, despite evidence presented
by the government proving that contributions to federal candidates were reim-
bursed with corporate funds20 3 and evidence supporting an inference that the
defendant "knew that reimbursements were being made for these contribu-
tions." 2°aAfter reviewing all the evidence presented by the prosecution, Judge
Matsch concluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that the
defendant acted with the intent to obstruct or impede the operations of the FEC
or to cause the campaigns to file false reports with the FEC.20 5 Based upon that
199. No. 91-CR-243 (D. Colo. 1991).
200. Indictment, United States v. Mandarich, (No. 91-CR-243) (D. Colo. 1991). The conspiracy to
defraud count (count 1) charged that David Mandarich, as the president of M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., con-
spired with others to defraud the United States and the Federal Election Commission by impeding, im-
pairing and obstructing the lawful governmental functions of the commission in administering and
seeking to obtain compliance with the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended. See id. at 1-2. The conspiracy to defraud was accomplished by reimbursing employees who
made contributions to candidates for federal office and to those candidates' authorized committees.
These employees were promised reimbursement for their contributions. See id. at 3-7. Due to Man-
darich's acts, the authorized committees of the candidates and the Democratic National Committee pre-
pared reports that were false in that they stated that persons (named in the indictment, pages 3-5) had
made contributions. See id, at 6. Those incorrect reports were transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate
and the Federal Election Commission. See id. at 7.
The false statements counts (indictment counts 2-5) charge that Mandarich knowingly and willfully
falsified, concealed, and covered up and caused to be falsified, concealed, and covered up by trick,
scheme, and device the material fact that Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. made contributions to "Ken Kramer
'86,"' and the Hart committees; that Richard Homes Limited made contributions to the Hart committees,
the "DNC Victory Fund Federal Account," and "Hank Brown for U.S. Senate;" and that Richmond
American Homes of Colorado, Inc. made a contribution to "Hank Brown for U.S. Senate" (the names of
the owners, officers, and employees as well as the contribution amounts are reported in the indictment at
7, 9-10, 11, 13). See id. at 7-13.
201. The court orally granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Trial to Jury-Day 5, Transcript of Proceedings at 2-3,
United States v. Mandarich, No. 91-CR-243 (D. Colo. 1992).
202. See id. at 16-19.
203. See id at 6.
204. Id. at 7. Judge Matsch emphasized to the jury that the defendant had denied knowledge of the
reimbursements through his plea of not guilty. See id.
205. See id. at 18-19. Judge Matsch reached this result after taking into account the holding of the
Supreme Court in the Yermian case. See United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68 (1984) (holding that
the statute's plain language and its legislative history show that proof of actual knowledge of federal
agency jurisdiction is not required to obtain a conviction for making a false statement within the juris-
diction of a federal agency).
The Yermian Court analyzed the relevant language of § 1001 (as it read it at that time). "Whoever in
any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and
willfully.. .makes any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations.., shall be fined...
." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001). The Court concluded that:
The statutory language requiring that knowingly false statements be made "'in any matter
Yale Law & Policy Review
conclusion, Judge Matsch entered a judgment of acquittal for the defendant. 0 6
The difficulties prosecutors face when pursuing felony charges based on
FECA violations are not limited to close scrutiny by careful trial judges, such
as Judge Matsch, and appellate courts such as the Third Circuit panel that de-
cided Curran. Juries also appear to be less likely to accept the argument that
violations of federal election laws support felony conspiracy charges. In United
States v. Goland,2 °7 the defendant, a political operative, engaged in a scheme to
finance a television commercial for a candidate, which actually was intended to
benefit a different candidate, without disclosing the source of funds that paid
for the commercial. After an initial mistrial, a second jury acquitted Goland on
the first count of a multi-count indictment, which charged him with conspiracy
to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding the lawful function of
the FEC and conspiracy to knowingly cause the filing of false campaign fi-
nance statements with the FEC in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.208 Goland was
also acquitted of two counts of causing campaign committees to file false re-
ports, while the jury hung on a third count of the same offense. 209 The jury
found Goland guilty on only a single count of willfully making an excessive
campaign contribution, a misdemeanor. 2  The acquittal on the felony charges
demonstrates the burden prosecutors face when they bring felony conspiracy
charges based on technical election law violations.
The government suffered an even more dramatic loss in the only case
brought by the Department of Justice's Campaign Financing Task Force that
has gone to trial at the time of this writing. In United States v. Haney,211 the
government brought a 42-count criminal indictment against Tennessee real es-
tate developer Franklin L. Haney. The indictment charged that Haney had
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency..."' is a jurisdictional requirement. Its
primary purpose is to identify the factor that makes the false statement an appropriate subject
for federal concern.... Certainly in this case, the statutory language makes clear that Congress
did not intend the terms "'knowingly and willfully' to establish the standard of culpability for
the jurisdictional element of § 1001. The jurisdictional language appears in a phrase separate
from the prohibited conduct modified by the terms 'knowingly and willfully."' Any natural
reading of § 1001, therefore, establishes that the terms "'knowingly and willfully"' modify
only the making of "'false, fictitious or fraudulent statements"' and not the predicate circum-
stance that those statements be made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Id.
at 68-69.
In Mandarich Judge Matsch concluded that the words "knowingly and willfully falsify, conceal, or
cover up by any trick scheme or device" in § 1001 were the "critical words" in his legal analysis of the
case. Trial to Jury-Day 5, Transcript of Proceedings at 16, United States v. Mandarich, No. 91-CR-243
(D. Colo. 1992). Judge Matsch's analysis anticipated the holding of the Third Circuit in Curran the fol-
lowing year.
206. See Trial to Jury-Day 5, Transcript of Proceedings at 23. United States v. Mandarich, No. 91-
CR-243 (D. Colo. 1992).
207. 959 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1992).
208. See id. at 1451.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See Indictment, United States v. Haney, No. 98-0383 (RWR) (D.D.C. filed Nov. 4, 1998).
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made "conduit" campaign contributions to various federal candidates through
his family, his employees, and friends and family of his employees. Count 1 of
the indictment charged Haney with conspiring to defraud the United States by
impairing and impeding the functions of the FEC, conspiring to cause others
(campaign treasurers) to file false statements with the FEC, conspiring to vio-
late the FECA prohibitions on contributions in the name of another and contri-
butions in excess of the $1,000 individual contribution limit.212
In this manner, the Department of Justice Campaign Financing Task Force
used all of its "big guns"-the "felony theories for FECA prosecutions" out-
lined in the Department's manual on "Federal Prosecution of Election Of-
fenses"213-- on a high-profile defendant in an election law violation case. Much
like the Curran case, in Haney the defendant's conduct "could have established
the basis for misdemeanor violations under the [Federal] Election Campaign
Act," but the government instead pursued felony charges because for some of
the contribution at issue that "Act's [three year] statute of limitations had ex-
pired . .. ,,214 In June 1999, after a nine-day trial with six days of testimony, the
jury acquitted Haney of all 42 counts in the indictment."'
The acquittal in United States v. Haney is noteworthy for two reasons.
First, unlike Goland, in Haney the jury acquitted the defendant of both the fel-
ony charges and the misdemeanor FECA charges. Second, and most significant
to the question of whether the government should continue to pursue its "fel-
ony theories for FECA prosecutions," the use of the conspiracy charge cost the
government its case. According to the foreperson of the jury, the jury decided
to acquit on all charges because the government was unable to prove the con-
spiracy charge in count 1 of the indictment. In an interview immediately after
the trial, the jury foreperson told a reporter that in the jury's "thinking, the
controlling charge was the conspiracy charge.., so if you did not have a con-
spiracy, all these [other] charges fell by the wayside." 216 This suggests that the
tactical advantages and enhanced penalties that prosecutors obtain by using the
conspiracy statute in election law cases may come at a high price in obtaining
convictions.
The Haney case adds a new element to a prosecutor's analysis of whether
or not to try to obtain a felony conspiracy conviction in an election law case. In
addition to the inherent difficulties the prosecution faces in proving felony con-
spiracy and false statements charges, 217 those charges may "infect" the (pre-
212. See id.
213. DOJMANUAL, supranote 1, at 108.
214. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 566 (3d Cir. 1994).
215. See Andy Sher, Developer Haney Acquitted on All 42 Charges; Jury Focused on Conspiracy
Count, Foreman Says, CHATrANOOGA TIMES, July 2,1999, at Al.
216. Id.
217. The Department of Justice has explicitly recognized these difficulties. "Proving these addi-
tional elements may be difficult in campaign financing cases." DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 109.
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sumably more easily proven) misdemeanor charges and cause the government
to lose its entire case. Thus, the post-Hopkins judicial scrutiny of felony
charges in election law cases, coupled with possible juror skepticism of those
charges, suggest that as a strategic matter prosecutors should hesitate before
bringing such charges in garden-variety election law cases.
218
4. Making Sense of the Cases
Because of the admittedly egregious nature of the underlying conduct in
Hopkins, the holding in that case does not necessarily legitimate felony con-
spiracy prosecution of misdemeanors in all instances. Cases since Hopkins
have demonstrated a marked reluctance on the part of juries and trial judges to
convict-Haney, Goland, and Mandarich-or uphold convictions-Curran-
for felony conspiracy charges where the evidence establishes only violations of
the technical provisions of the FECA. Read together, these cases suggest that,
contrary to a broad reading of Hopkins, evidence of an FECA violation alone is
not sufficient to support a felony conspiracy charge.
This analysis of election law cases is also consistent with a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Licci-
ardi,219 an appellate decision analyzing federal conspiracy charges that were
predicated on alleged violations of another regulatory reporting requirement-
wine-labeling reports required by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms (BATF).
In Licciardi the defendant caused inaccurate field tags to be placed on
shipments of grapes, which permitted him to obtain a higher price for grapes he
sold to a winery but also caused the winery to file inaccurate reports with the
BATF. 220 Focusing on the mens rea element required for a conspiracy convic-
tion, the court observed that for a century it has been settled law that to convict
for conspiracy the government must prove at least the degree of criminal intent
necessary for the substantive offense itself.221 The court concluded that under
"this consistent construction" of the conspiracy statute, the government had
failed to prove its conspiracy case against Licciardi.22 2.
The court began its analysis of the conspiracy charge by noting that "[i]f all
the government had to prove was that Licciardi had used dishonest means and
that these means had the effect of impairing a function of the BATF, the gov-
218. But see United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 1998) (refusing to dismiss a conspir-
acy charge when the allegations in the indictment included interference with the functions of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, as well as garden-variety election law violations), rev'd on other
grounds 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
219. 30 F.3d 1127(9th Cir. 1994).
220. See id. at 1129.
221. See id. at 1131 (citing Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207 (1893), and United States
v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975)).
222. Licciardi,30F.3dat 1132.
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eminent would easily have prevailed., 223 In the view of the Ninth Circuit, that
showing was not sufficient to support the conspiracy charge, however, because
the mere fact "[t]hat the incidental effects of [his] actions would have been to
impair the functions of the BATF does not confer upon him the mens rea of ac-
complishing that object. 224 The court concluded that the conspiracy to defraud
charge based on the BATF reports was fatally flawed, but Licciardi's conspir-
acy conviction was not reversed because the court found evidence sufficient to
support a second object of the charged conspiracy - obtaining money from
the winery by fraudulent representations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the
federal mail fraud statute. 225 Licciardi's use of the mails in connection with his
scheme left him vulnerable to this charge.
The Licciardi court expressed considerable disquiet with efforts by prose-
cutors to "recurrently push to expand the limits" of the federal conspiracy stat-
22
ute. 226 The court found it "instructive" that on prior occasions the Supreme
Court has "rebuffed a prosecutor's imaginative and unjustified expansion of
the statute. 2 27 In Licciardi's case the Ninth Circuit concluded that "a regula-
tory scheme, which does not have criminal penalties attached to it, has been
converted by the government's theory into a system whose violation by com-
mercial cheating is subject to the severe felony penalties of the conspiracy
law. 228 The Ninth Circuit's rejection of that theory is, to use the court's word,
"instructive" in the federal election laws context, where prosecutors have
sought to use the conspiracy statute to convert a carefully crafted statutory
scheme, in which Congress explicitly provided that knowing and willful of-
fenses should be punished as misdemeanors, into a system in which violations
are subject to severe felony punishment. The recent election law cases demon-
strate that, consistent with the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the conspiracy charge
in Licciardi, more than a violation of regulatory requirements should be re-
quired to support a conspiracy conviction.
The one conceivable rationale for punishing conspiracies more severely
than underlying criminal conduct is the "group danger" theory discussed in a
1959 article in the Harvard Law Review.2 29 The article observed that it is
within the prerogative of the legislature to punish group behavior more harshly
than individual behavior of the same nature: "Although severely punishing a
group for agreeing to commit what would be at most a misdemeanor... seems
incongruous, conduct legislatively declared a misdemeanor is by definition an-
223. Id. at 1131.
224. Id. at 1132.
225. Seeid. at H133.
226. Id. at 1133.
227. Id. (citing Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1923); Pettibone v. United States,
148 U.S. 197 (1893); and Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987)).
228. Id. at 1133.
229. See Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 941 (1959).
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tisocial... [and] when a group intends such conduct, antisocial effects greater
than those envisaged by the legislature [in cases involving individual action]
may result, and the effectiveness of normal social inhibiting pressures is less-
ened., 230 This concern with "group danger" is not present, however, when the
legislature has considered the issue and decided that conspiracies to commit
misdemeanors should be punished as misdemeanors, as Part II demonstrates
was the case with the 1948 amendments to the federal conspiracy statute.
Moreover, Congress implicitly addressed the "group danger" issue when it
amended the federal election laws in 1976. At that time Congress decided to
impose only misdemeanor punishment for those election law violations, such
as contributions in the name of another 231 and contributions with corporate
funds,232 that by necessity require more than one person. In fact, a "conduit
contribution" is a paradigmatic example of a "group" crime-in such cases a
person will provide funds to several "straw donors" or "conduits" who then
make contributions in their own name with the funds that have been given to
233them. Although more than one person is always involved in such a violation,
Congress made the offense a misdemeanor. Further, the Department of Justice
does not typically seek to prosecute the conduit straw donors, treating them in-
stead as witnesses.234 All of these considerations demonstrate that the "group
danger" rationale for felony prosecution does not apply to conspiracies to vio-
late the misdemeanor election law offenses that Congress moved in 1976 from
the criminal code235 to the Federal Election Campaign Act.236
The government's losses in the Curran, Goland (on the felony charges),
Haney, and Mandarich cases do not mean that prosecutorial misuse of the con-
spiracy statute in election law cases is not a serious problem. As long as
bringing felony charges in garden-variety election law cases is an available op-
tion - even one with risks attached - the government can hold the club of fel-
ony charges over the heads of defendants who have violated election laws. The
defendant in Curran "testified that he 'was not focused on the Federal Election
Commission,' that he didn't remember ever hearing about it, and that he
'didn't focus on' whether it monitored federal campaign contributions., 237 This
230. Id. (citations omitted). Cf Goldstein, supra note 16, at 413 ("Building on the assumption that
a group is more to be feared than individuals acting separately, courts concluded that a plan by two or
more persons to commit crime brings with it an increased likelihood that: the participants will reinforce
each other's determination to carry out the criminal object; the object will be successfully attained; the
extent of the injury to society will be large; those who commit it will escape detection; and the group's
planning will have a long term educative effect on its members, with schooling in crime the result.").
231. See 2 U.S.C. § 441f(1994).
232. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994).
233. See, e.g., DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 103-04 (describing conduit contribution schemes).
234. See id.
235. Prior to 1976 those offenses were at 18 U.S.C. §§ 608 and 610-617 (1975). See DOJ
MANUAL, supra note 1, at 95.
236. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441h; see also DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1, at 95.
237. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 1994).
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testimony did not stop the Department of Justice from charging the defendant
with conspiring to defraud the United States by impeding the FEC's perform-
ance "through obstruction and interference with the Commission's reporting
requirements and by causing fictitious statements to be made on reports re-
quired to be sent to the Commission." 238 He was convicted of that charge after
a jury trial in federal court.239 The fact that the conviction did not withstand
240
appellate scrutiny provides little comfort to the defendant in that case or po-
tential defendants in similar cases. Many potential defendants have neither the
resources nor the will to go to trial against the Department of Justice, even if
they could be confident that the judge would throw out the government's case
(as in Mandarich) or the jury would render a verdict of acquittal on all charges
(as in Haney). The mere fact that the government can threaten to bring felony
charges in a case involving nothing more than regulatory offenses that Con-
gress has specifically defined as misdemeanors gives the prosecution a tremen-
dous-and tremendously unfair-advantage. The fact that the government may
fail to make good on its threat in the rare case where a defendant has the re-
sources and the will to fight back does not mean that the system is self-
correcting or that the government's charging decisions should be immune from
scrutiny and criticism.
IV. CONCLUSION
In focusing on the required elements of a felony conspiracy charge in elec-
tion law conspiracy cases, the courts have not paid sufficient attention to the
misdemeanor offense clause of the conspiracy statute, and to the intent of Con-
gress in adding that clause in 1948. Nor have the courts given sufficient weight
to the intent of Congress, in its 1976 amendments to the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act, to reduce the penalties for violations of that Act from felonies to
misdemeanors. Taken together, the 1948 amendment to the conspiracy statute
and the 1976 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act indicate that
Congress (1) intended to punish conspiracies to violate that Act as misdemean-
ors, subject to a three-year statute of limitations, and not as felonies, and (2)
did not intend for prosecutors to use the defraud clause of the conspiracy stat-
ute to obtain a felony conviction, or to extend the statute of limitations, in
election law cases.
The reluctance of the courts to accept felony conspiracy charges in recent
campaign finance cases is consistent with an interpretation of the conspiracy
statute mandating that only misdemeanor conspiracy charges should be brought
when the underlying conduct clearly constitutes nothing more than a misde-
238. Id. at 571.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 572 (reporting that the trial court judgment was vacated and the case was remanded
for a new trial).
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 18:225, 2000
meanor. Moreover, the reluctance of juries to convict defendants of conspiracy
charges in election law cases should make prudent prosecutors hesitate before
employing "felony theories." In the end, however, neither of these develop-
ments really addresses the underlying problem of prosecutorial misuse of the
conspiracy statute. The real answer to this problem is for prosecutors to stop
misusing the conspiracy statute by straining to bring felony charges where
Congress clearly intended for misdemeanor penalties to apply.
